"Lec 23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education" Game Theory (ECON 159) We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We should always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. In the first setting, information is verifiable. Here, the failure explicitly to reveal information can be informative, and hence verifiable information tends to come out even when you don't want it to. We consider examples of such information unraveling. Then we move to unverifiable information. Here, it is hard to convey such information even if you want to. Nevertheless, differentially costly signals can sometimes provide incentives for agents with different information to distinguish themselves. In particular, we consider how the education system can allow future workers to signal their abilities. We discuss some implications of this rather pessimistic view of education. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Asymmetric Information: Signaling and Information Unraveling 16:48 - Chapter 2. Information Unraveling: Examples 35:07 - Chapter 3. Signaling: Good and Bad Workers 59:36 - Chapter 4. Signaling: Conclusions Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.
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Tags: Cournot competition education Nash equilibrium separating signaling Spence model subgame perfection
Uploaded by: yalegametheory ( Send Message ) on 02-09-2012.
Duration: 70m 37s
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Lec 1 - Introduction: five first lessons
Lec 2 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
Lec 3 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
Lec 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Lec 5 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
Lec 6 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
Lec 7 - Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
Lec 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
Lec 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
Lec 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
Lec 11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
Lec 13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
Lec 14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
Lec 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
Lec 16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
Lec 17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
Lec 18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
Lec 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
Lec 20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
Lec 21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
Lec 22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
Lec 24- Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse