"Lec 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization" Game Theory (ECON 159) We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling's location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, "mixed strategies." Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Candidate - Voter Model 14:22 - Chapter 2. Location and Segregation: Why Outcomes Are Not Necessarily Preferences 46:01 - Chapter 3. Location and Segregation: Examples 52:10 - Chapter 4. Location and Segregation: Policy Implications 57:51 - Chapter 5. Location and Segregation: Central vs. Individual Randomization 01:00:51 - Chapter 6. Pure vs. Mixed Strategies: Rock, Paper, Scissors Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.
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Tags: Bayes-Nash equilibrium best response candidate voter Game Theory median mixed strategies randomization rock paper scissors Strategic behavior
Uploaded by: yalegametheory ( Send Message ) on 01-09-2012.
Duration: 73m 50s
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Lec 1 - Introduction: five first lessons
Lec 2 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
Lec 3 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
Lec 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Lec 5 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
Lec 6 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
Lec 7 - Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
Lec 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
Lec 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
Lec 11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
Lec 13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
Lec 14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
Lec 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
Lec 16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
Lec 17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
Lec 18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
Lec 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
Lec 20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
Lec 21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
Lec 22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
Lec 23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
Lec 24- Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse