"Lec 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis" Game Theory (ECON 159) We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Mixed Strategies: Definition 06:02 - Chapter 2. Mixed Strategies: Examples 22:20 - Chapter 3. Mixed Strategies: Direct and Indirect Effects on the Nash Equilibrium 27:05 - Chapter 4. Mixed Strategies and the Nash Equilibrium: Example Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.
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