"Lec 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis" Game Theory (ECON 159) We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Mixed Strategies: Definition 06:02 - Chapter 2. Mixed Strategies: Examples 22:20 - Chapter 3. Mixed Strategies: Direct and Indirect Effects on the Nash Equilibrium 27:05 - Chapter 4. Mixed Strategies and the Nash Equilibrium: Example Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.
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Tags: expected payoffs mixed strategies Nash equilibrium rock paper scissors game strategic behavior
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Lec 1 - Introduction: five first lessons
Lec 2 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
Lec 3 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
Lec 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Lec 5 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
Lec 6 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
Lec 7 - Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
Lec 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
Lec 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
Lec 11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
Lec 13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
Lec 14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
Lec 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
Lec 16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
Lec 17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
Lec 18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
Lec 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
Lec 20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
Lec 21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
Lec 22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
Lec 23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
Lec 24- Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse