"Lec 1 - Introduction: five first lessons" Game Theory (ECON 159) We introduce Game Theory by playing a game. We organize the game into players, their strategies, and their goals or payoffs; and we learn that we should decide what our goals are before we make choices. With some plausible payoffs, our game is a prisoners' dilemma. We learn that we should never choose a dominated strategy; but that rational play by rational players can lead to bad outcomes. We discuss some prisoners' dilemmas in the real world and some possible real-world remedies. With other plausible payoffs, our game is a coordination problem and has very different outcomes: so different payoffs matter. We often need to think, not only about our own payoffs, but also others' payoffs. We should put ourselves in others' shoes and try to predict what they will do. This is the essence of strategic thinking. 00:00 - Chapter 1. What Is Strategy? 02:16 - Chapter 2. Strategy: Where Does It Apply? 02:54 - Chapter 3. (Administrative Issues) 09:40 - Chapter 4. Elements of a Game: Strategies, Actions, Outcomes and Payoffs 21:38 - Chapter 5. Strictly Dominant versus Strictly Dominated Strategies 29:33 - Chapter 6. Contracts and Collusion 33:35 - Chapter 7. The Failure of Collusion and Inefficient Outcomes: Prisoner's Dilemma 41:40 - Chapter 8. Coordination Problems 01:07:53 - Chapter 9. Lesson Recap Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.
Video is embedded from external source so embedding is not available.
Video is embedded from external source so download is not available.
Channels: Others
Tags: Dominant Strategies Dominated Efficient outcomes Game Theory Strategic behavior
Uploaded by: yalegametheory ( Send Message ) on 01-09-2012.
Duration: 68m 33s
No content is added to this lecture.
This video is a part of a lecture series from of Yale
Lec 2 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
Lec 3 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
Lec 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Lec 5 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
Lec 6 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
Lec 7 - Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
Lec 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
Lec 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
Lec 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
Lec 11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
Lec 13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
Lec 14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
Lec 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
Lec 16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
Lec 17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
Lec 18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
Lec 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
Lec 20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
Lec 21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
Lec 22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
Lec 23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
Lec 24- Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse