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    Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles

    "Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles" Game Theory (ECON 159) We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Definition 30:50 - Chapter 2. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Hawk vs. Dove 50:00 - Chapter 3. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Discussion 55:39 - Chapter 4. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Identification and Testability Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

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