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Lec 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats

Game Theory (ECON 159) We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way for player 1 to force a win, or there is a way for player 1 to force a tie, or there is a way for player 2 to force a win. The proof is by induction. Then we formally define and informally discuss both perfect information and strategies in such games. This allows us to find Nash equilibria in sequential games. But we find that some Nash equilibria are inconsistent with backward induction. In particular, we discuss an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible. 00:00 - Chapter 1. First and Second Mover Advantages: Zermelo's Theorem 10:17 - Chapter 2. Zermelo's Theorem: Proof 17:06 - Chapter 3. Zermelo's Theorem: Generalization 31:20 - Chapter 4. Zermelo's Theorem: Games of Induction 40:27 - Chapter 5. Games of Perfect Information: Definition 01:01:56 - Chapter 6. Games of Perfect Information: Economic Example Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

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Tags: Backward Induction credible threats market entry mathematical Nash equilibrium sub-game perfect Zermelo theorem

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