"Lec 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes" Game Theory (ECON 159) We develop three different interpretations of mixed strategies in various contexts: sport, anti-terrorism strategy, dating, paying taxes and auditing taxpayers. One interpretation is that people literally randomize over their choices. Another is that your mixed strategy represents my belief about what you might do. A third is that the mixed strategy represents the proportions of people playing each pure strategy. Then we discuss some implications of the mixed equilibrium in games; in particular, we look how the equilibrium changes in the tax-compliance/auditor game as we increase the penalty for cheating on your taxes. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Mixed Strategy Equilibria: Example (Continued) 12:49 - Chapter 2. Mixed Strategy Equilibria: Other Examples in Sports 23:41 - Chapter 3. Mixed Strategy Equilibria Interpretation 1: Literal Randomization 28:17 - Chapter 4. Mixed Strategy Equilibria Interpretation 2: Players' Beliefs about Each Other's Actions 47:04 - Chapter 5. Mixed Strategy Equilibria Interpretation 3: Prediction of Split on Two or More Courses of Action in a Large Population 59:52 - Chapter 6. Mixed Strategy Equilibria: Policy Applications Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.
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Tags: Battle Sexes Bayes Nash equilibrium best responses coordination games Game theory mixed strategies pure
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Duration: 73m 32s
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Lec 1 - Introduction: five first lessons
Lec 2 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
Lec 3 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
Lec 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Lec 5 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
Lec 6 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
Lec 7 - Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
Lec 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
Lec 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
Lec 11 - Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
Lec 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
Lec 13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
Lec 14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
Lec 15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
Lec 16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
Lec 17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
Lec 18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
Lec 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
Lec 20 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
Lec 21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
Lec 22 - Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
Lec 23 - Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
Lec 24- Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse